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BOOK REVIEW
THE CONTIGUOUS AIR SPACE ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.
By John Taylor Murchison, B.C.L. (U.N.B.) L.L.M. (McGill). Published
by Department of National Defense, Ottawa, October, 1955, Revised to
December 1, 1956, 113 pp.
Squadron Leader Murchison has written an interesting, informative, and
provocative work rationalizing the creation by United States and Canadian
authorities of the ADIZ's and CADIZ's-those towering chunks of air space
forming a mid-century Maginot Line around the greater part of the North
American Continent, extending seaward up to three hundred miles.
The Air Defense Identification Zones-ADIZ (U.S.), CADIZ (Canadian)
-were established by parallel regulatory action of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (Part 620) and of the Canadian Department of Transport,
Air Services Branch (NOTAM 22/55) respectively. These zones are described in detail in each regulation and are laid out with reference to coordinates of longitude and latitude. Most of the zones extend well out over the
high seas, and this fact is the basis for the book. Obviously to the extent
these zones are descriptive only, they are well within the power of any state
to create. Any country may describe any geographic area, bounded in any
way it sees fit, and give it whatever name it likes. It is only the application
or attempted application of rules within such zones that poses problems.
Since the Regulations referred to do impose certain rules for aircraft operating in or into these zones, problems of jurisdiction exist.
Author Murchison approaches his task by briefly describing the regulations of the two governments. He then discusses the rules laid down with
reference to the Chicago Convention of 1944 and concludes that there is no
violation of that treaty. Thereafter he approaches the problem as one of
international law apart from treaty and analogizes the rules to the claims
made to the subsoil of the continental shelf, and to the broader aspects of
Maritime Law. He finally justifies them as proper governmental action
based on the doctrines of necessity and of self-preservation.
In dealing with the question whether the rules are properly grounded
in the municipal laws of Canada and the United States respectively, Author
Murchison concludes that the legal basis in Canada is highly doubtful and
that "it would appear that legally speaking, a violation of these rules outside
the territorial waters of Canada would lead to nothing but an exercise in
frustration for the conclusion must be reached that the punitive provisions
of the Act would not apply for the reason that a violation of the NOTAM
which lacks the authority or sanction of the Act, would not be a violation
of that Act."
With respect to the American rules, the author states "The establishment
of ADIZ, on the other hand, is solidly founded on American municipal law
for Part 620 is based on an executive order by the President, and as such
has the force of law in the United States." It may be questioned whether
this is not too charitable a conclusion. The executive order to which he
refers in turn finds its authority in Title 12 of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
as amended. Section 1203 of that Title reads in part as follows:
"The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to establish such zones
or areas in the air space above the United States, its Territories and

possessions (including areas of land or water administered by the

United States under international agreement) as he may find necessary in the interests of national security ......
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Consequently the validity of the action by the Secretary of Commerce,
insofar as these zones are established over the high seas, depends on whether
these are areas of "water administered by the United States under international agreement." They quite obviously are not. Consequently the basis
for American action would appear to be no sounder than the Canadian.
Murchison finds that there are minor differences in detail between the
two sets of regulations, and points out that the American rules apply only
to aircraft which subsequently enter United States territory, whereas the
Canadian rules purportedly apply to all aircraft passing through the zone
irrespective of destination. This is true at least in part. The Canadian
regulations require position reporting of all aircraft passing through the
zones, whereas such reporting in the case of the ADIZ is required only for
aircraft entering the United States. However, both sets of regulations
require that flight plans be filed by all aircraft prior to penetrating an ADIZ
(Section 620.11 Regulations of the Administrator) or a CADIZ (Section 2.3
Canadian NOTAM). Each set of regulations requires reasonable adherence
to the flight plan both with respect to time, location and altitude. Consequently each set of rules applies, to some extent, to aircraft traversing the
identification zone as well as to aircraft destined for the territory of the
country concerned.
In discussing the rules applicable in the CADIZ's and ADIZ's in relation
to commitments under the Chicago Convention, the author points out that
the subject of sovereignty over the high seas is not dealt with in that
Convention. He does advert to Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, dealing
with rules of the air, which provides in part that "over the high seas, the
rules in force shall be those established under this Convention." He concludes that this provision has no relationship to the rules promulgated for
the identification zones, since he is of the opinion that the rules of the air
are "rules of the road" only and that security considerations lie outside
their purview.
While we can join with the author in his conclusion that security rules
would be compatible with obligations under the Convention, this would be
true only so long as the rules for the security control of air traffic do not
conflict with the international rules of the road laid down by the Convention.
In this case it is to be noted that both the Canadian and the American
regulations call for the filing of a flight plan including a statement of cruising altitude. In each case adherence to the flight plan is mandatory. If this
requirement is applied to mean maintenance of a fixed altitude above the
surface, it could very easily conflict with the international rules, which call
for cruising at a constant indicated altitude at a fixed barometric setting
of the altimeter. Flight levels consequently vary with the barometer. The
indicated altitude under the international rules could differ by as much as
a thousand feet from the absolute altitude over the surface. Consequently
it is submitted that to the extent the security rules may be in direct conflict
with the rules of the air laid down by ICAO they are violative of the provisions of the Convention, notwithstanding the difference in purpose of the
regulations concerned.
The most interesting parts of the book are Chapters IV and V dealing
with analogies in the Maritime Law and with the doctrine of necessity and
self-preservation. In the former the author discusses the doctrine of the
freedom of the seas as limited by the "hovering laws" and the doctrine of
hot pursuit. However, as the author appears to agree, the doctrine based
on the hovering acts and similar enactments of the past have been largely
limited to matters concerning customs and sanitary laws.
In Chapter V the author takes even a broader view of the subject and
justifies the regulations in the ADIZ's and CADIZ's under the doctrine of
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self-preservation combined with the doctrine of necessity, quoting Elihu
'Root's statement that "every sovereign State has a right to protect itself by
preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself."
The crux of the author's discussion in regard to necessity and self-preservation is that "the very existence of the State makes these identification
zones seaward a necessity." But since an air attack may come from any
direction, over either land or water, there would appear to be equal necessity
for such an identification zone over land areas under the sovereignty of
other states. While the problem does not arise in connection with the common defense of the North American Continent, it would become a very real
one in connection with certain European countries. Is landlocked Switzerland to be entitled any less to avail itself of the doctrine of necessity than
water-surrounded Australia? Yet if Switzerland were to enact SADIZ's,
they would perforce have to lie over territories of neighboring states. Such
an application of the doctrine of necessity would be completely incompatible
with the sovereign rights in the air space of the neighboring states.
In one respect the book is disappointingly silent. There is no discussion
of, nor justification based upon, the fact that the rules, in both instances,
are designed to aid in identifying aircraft. The approach of the book has
been a geographical one, rather than one based on the subject matter of the
rules themselves in their application to conduct over the high seas.
Yet one of the traditions of the seas is the obligation of vessels plying
them to identify themselves. In the MariannaFlora, 11 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 405
(U. S. Sup. Ct. 1826), the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Story, held
that an overtly hostile act on the high seas by a Portuguese merchantman,
coupled with failure to identify herself, completely excused an attack made
by a U. S. naval vessel on her, even though the hostile act was committed
under the mistaken belief that the American vessel was a pirate. Moreover,
the Court held that the further action of the American commander in putting
a prize crew aboard the Portuguese ship and sailing her to a U. S. port for
adjudication was not an act for which damages should lie under the circumstances. The e4uivocal conduct on the part of the merchantman, including
the failure to show its flag, was complete justification for the attack, capture,
and detention by the U. S. vessel, which had been commissioned to sail
against pirates.
From sailing vessels to aircraft is a long step, but the need for identification in the new element is still recognized by the international community.
Thus, Article 20 of the Chicago Convention requires that "Every aircraft
engaged in international air navigation shall bear its appropriate nationality
and registration marks."
Thus, provision is made for identification to the eye. However, with
radar now in general use, is there not a further obligation incumbent upon
both vessels and aircraft operating on or over international waters to take
reasonable measures to identify themselves to the radar eye under circumstances where failure to do so could give all the signs of a hostile or illegal
mission? Perhaps with further development of IFF transponders it will be
possible for ships and aircraft to identify themselves automatically and
specifically. However, in the present state of the art, the flight plan filed
in advance is the best method for linking up the blips on the radar screen
with the airplanes in the sky.
Basically the regulations for the CADIZ's and the ADIZ's do no more
than require such identification-even the position reporting requirement
of the Canadians is justifiable under this objective. Admittedly filing a
flight plan and reporting are a burden-but so is hoisting a flag, and both
are reasonable obligations.
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Under such an approach the CADIZ's and ADIZ's cease to be zones within
which Canada and the United States attempt to exercise extra-territorial
power. They become merely descriptive of one of the conditions which would
make the failure to identify oneself an equivocal and suspicious act. In this
connection there is a vast difference between mid-ocean operations, in the
present state of the art, and operations within 15 minutes' cruising range
of the coast by supersonic bomber. Aircraft operating outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any state, but within so short a distance of the nearest
country's coast, place themselves in an equivocal and suspicious position if
they refuse to identify themselves-particularly in view of the history of
Pearl Harbor.
In other words, given the present international climate, the history of
the last 20 years, 1200 mile per hour bomber speeds, atomic and fission
bombs, and radar search, is it not incumbent upon a craft flying within easy
attacking range of a country's coast to say who he is and allow himself to
be identified as a blip on the radar screen? Obviously, the closer the aircraft
comes to the coast line, the greater is the duty to identify himself. The
ADIZ's and CADIZ's over the high seas can be regarded as declarations on
the part of Canada and the United States that foreign aircraft in those areas
will be regarded as acting suspiciously, equivocally, and with apparent hostile
intent if they do not identify themselves. Apparent hostility was the conduct
of the Marianna Flora which justified Lieutenant Stockton's attack and
seizure. It is equal justification, it is submitted, for "inflight interception
by military interceptor aircraft" (Sec. 2.10.1 Canadian NOTAM).
As for the criminal penalty provision of the United States regulation, it
is most doubtful whether this could be enforced in respect of a violation of
an ADIZ regulation over the high seas. Apart from international law, the
Civil Aeronautics Act does not give the Secretary of Commerce the right
to proclaim any such penalty outside the jurisdiction of the United States.
But "interception by military interceptor aircraft" would, it is submitted,
be entirely justifiable for the United States as well as Canada.
The foregoing criticisms, however, do not adversely affect the value of
the book. It is a definite contribution to learning in a field where the literature is sparse, and the promise of further writing dim because of the transitory nature of the specific problem. At the outset of this review, the
identification zones were likened to the Maginot Line. Already the intercontinental ballistic missile is making them obsolescent. True space flight
will render them virtually useless in their present configurations.
One continuing principle, however, appears clear. Freedom to use international channels of communication-the high seas, the air above, or the
space beyond-does not include freedom to prey upon other commerce or
to mount an attack against any nation; and it devolves upon those who
would use such channels in peace to so conduct themselves that their bona
fides are apparent. Included is the obligation of identifying craft and mission
by whatever reasonable means is appropriate, wherever failure to do so
would prompt the observer, under the surrounding circumstances, to conclude the mission was hostile. This is true whether such surrounding
circumstances point to attacks by pirates on the Spanish Main in 1825,
enemy activity in a coastal ADIZ in 1957, or surprise action by space
marauders who war upon the interplanetary commerce of a time yet unborn.
G. NATHAN CALKINS, JR.

